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Abstract  
 As we are becoming a digital society, it is very important for us to 
protect the security of personal identity in any transactions. One of the 
efforts to maintain the security of personal identity is by unrevealed our data 
more than necessary. Anonymous credential allows an organization to give a 
credential to a user. This credential consists of user attribute such as address 
and date of birth. By using this credential, the user can prove the ownership 
to the third party without revealing the information that contained in 
credential information more than necessary. This paper proposes secure e-
health system that focuses on proving protocol to reveal and prove some of 
the patient attributes while others remain hidden, so the security of personal 
identity more awake. The experimental results showed that the 
computational time of each proving protocol less than 1 second. 
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Introduction 
 Currently, there are many using the Internet to access a variety of 
information about e-commerce, e-banking, and e-health, so the number of 
electronic transactions is increasing. One of the efforts to secure transactions 
is authentication by a variety of media including mobile phone, RFID tags, 
and also electronic identity card. The authentication mechanism requires the 
information of user’s personal identity, and this leads to reduced privacy of 
users because the transactions can be linked. Lack of privacy is a big 
problem in the case of trust of the user. 
 Anonymous credential is a technology that allows an organization to 
give a credential to a user (Bichsel et.al, 2009). This credential consists of 
user attribute such as address and date of birth. By using this credential, the 
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user can prove the ownership to the third party without revealing the 
information that contained in credential information more than necessary 
(Yuliana et.al, 2014). For instance, the user can prove the ownership of a 
credential that contains the user aged over 21 by using an ID card, by not 
revealing other data unnecessary. This is the reason why anonymous 
credential becoming very popular because the system can minimize the 
misuse of data by parties who are not responsible. 
 There are many types of research about anonymous credential with 
various methods or algorithms (Yuliana et.al, 2015). In addition to the basic 
functions of an anonymous credential, there is some research on the 
development of anonymous credentials such as enhancement of proving 
attributes (Belenky et al, 2009),  an efficiency of coding attributes 
(Sudarsono et al, 2011), and implementation on Java card (Camenisch et al, 
2008). However, that research only focuses on the computational complexity 
of each scheme, rarely that focus on the implementation and performance of 
the system. 
 In this research, it will be proposed secure e-health system that can 
improve the security of personal identity using anonymous credential. This 
system allows the user to reveal and prove some of the attributes while 
others remain hidden not only using CL signature but also by logical 
relations proof that includes AND, OR, NOT relations on several attributes, 
so the security of personal identity more awake.   
 We structure the remainder of this paper as follows. In section 2, 
related works of personal identity are described, and logic relation proof will 
be explained. In section 3, we describe secure e-health system design. The 
proposed secure e-health system will be discussed in section 4. A prototype 
implementation and performance measurement will be tested at section 5. 
Finally, we conclude our paper at section 6.   
  
Related Works  
 Some research discusses the authentication system to secure personal 
data (Maji et al, 2011), and also anonymous authentication in e-health 
system which satisfies patient’s personal information protection (i.e., health 
status information) from other patients, doctors, or pharmacists using 
Anonymous Credential System based CL signature and construct the system 
by Java programming language (Yuliana et.al, 2014). 
 The other authors extend the anonymous credential such that 
selection of attributes disclosure becomes more efficient by encoding 
attributes as prime numbers (Guo et al, 2013). This method provides 
significant advantages for a device that has limited computing capabilities 
such as smart card. Some other research also discusses the efficiency of 
attributes, thereby reducing computational complexity (Guo et al, 2014). 
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 Anonymous credential system allows users to prove the ownership of 
the credential, by minimizing the disclosure of information. Some research 
extends proving protocol of anonymous credential based CL-signature with 
logic relation proof that includes AND, OR and NOT (Guo et al, 2014). The 
results show the complexity of computational is constantly based on the 
amount of exponentiation and pairing. Other researchers discuss security in 
e-health systems that focused on the security of e commerce, not personal 
identity (Androulaki et al, 2011). 
  
Logic Relations Proof 
 Anonymous system consists of several rules for issuers, recipients, 
users, and verifiers. On issuing protocol, credential created by the issuers, 
and recipients will prove the ownership of credential by using proving 
protocol to the verifiers. Assumed users obtain CL credential that consists of  
𝐸, for example, signature(𝐴, 𝑒, 𝑣) on the message 𝑚0 and 𝑚1 where 𝑚1 = 𝐸. 
 
AND Relation 
 Users convince the verifier that credential contains an attribute with a 
specific value by using AND relation. Assumed attribute encode with prime 
𝑒𝑗, proving that can be done to convince the verifier that 𝑒𝑗 part of  𝐸 is: 
 
𝑃𝐾{(𝜀, 𝑣′, 𝜇0, 𝜇1
′ ): 
𝑍 ≡ ±𝑅0
𝜇0(𝑅1
𝑒𝑗)
𝜇1
′
𝐴′𝜀𝑆𝑣
′
(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) ∧ 
𝜇0𝜖 ± {0,1}
𝑙𝑚 ∧ 𝜇1
′ 𝜖 ± {0,1}𝑙𝑚−𝑙𝑡 ∧ 
𝜀 ∈ [2𝑙𝑒−1 + 1, 2𝑙𝑒 − 1]}                                                 (1) 
n is 2 primes and t to be worth ±1. If  𝑍 ≡ ±𝑅0
𝜇0𝑅1
𝐸𝐴′𝜀𝑆𝑣
′
 then 𝑅1
𝐸 =
(𝑅1
𝑒𝑗)
𝜇1
′
and 𝐸 = 𝑒1𝜇1
′ (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝′𝑞′), so 𝐸 = 𝑒𝑗𝜇1
′  to be worth integer and 𝑒𝑗 is 
a factor of  𝐸.  
 If there are some attributes that encode with primes 𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗 , 𝑒𝑙 then 
proving that can be done to convince the verifier 𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗 , 𝑒𝑙  part of  𝐸 is : 
𝑃𝐾{(𝜀, 𝑣′, 𝜇0, 𝜇1
′ ): 
𝑍 ≡ ±𝑅0
𝜇0(𝑅1
𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑙)
𝜇1
′
𝐴′𝜀𝑆𝑣
′
(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) ∧ 
𝜇0𝜖 ± {0,1}
𝑙𝑚 ∧ 𝜇1
′ 𝜖 ± {0,1}𝑙𝑚−3𝑙𝑡 ∧ 
𝜀 ∈ [2𝑙𝑒−1 + 1, 2𝑙𝑒 − 1]}                                                 (2) 
NOT Relation 
 Users convince the verifier that credential does not contain an 
attribute with a specific value by using NOT relation. Proving that 𝑒𝑗 ∤ 𝐸 can 
be done by showing that 𝑎𝐸 + 𝑏𝑒𝑗 = 1, where 𝑎 and 𝑏  would not exist if 
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𝑒𝑗|𝐸. After getting a value of  𝑎 and 𝑏, users generate random number r and 
compute commitment 𝐷 = 𝑔𝐸ℎ𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 to be sent to the verifier.  
 
 𝑃𝐾{(𝜀, 𝑣′, 𝜇0, 𝜇1, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜌
′): 
𝑍 ≡ ±𝑅0
𝜇0𝑅1
𝜇1𝐴′𝜀𝑆𝑣
′
(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) ∧ 
𝐷 ≡ ±𝑔𝜇1ℎ𝜌𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 ∧ 𝑔 ≡ ±𝐷𝛼(𝑔𝑐𝑗)𝛽ℎ𝜌′𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 ∧ 
𝜇0,𝜇1𝜖 ± {0,1}
𝑙𝑚 ∧ 𝜀𝜖[2𝑙𝑒−1 + 1, 2𝑙𝑒 − 1]                           (3) 
From 𝐷 ≡ ±𝑔𝜇1ℎ𝜌𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 and 𝑔 ≡ ±𝐷𝛼(𝑔𝑒𝑗)𝛽ℎ𝜌′𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛, it could be 
calculated 𝑔 ≡ ±𝑔𝜇1𝛼ℎ𝜌𝛼(𝑔𝑒𝑗)𝛽ℎ𝜌′. If user calculates 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔ℎ then  𝜇1𝛼 +
𝑒𝑗𝛽 = 1.  𝛼 and 𝛽 will exist if 𝑒𝑗 and 𝜇1 are co-prime so 𝑒𝑗|𝜇1. Because  𝜇1 
contained in CL signature, then it can be concluded that 𝑒𝑗 is not one of the 
attribute that encodes in 𝜇1.  
 
OR Relation 
 Users convince the verifier that credential contains one of the 
attributes with a specific value by using OR relation. Proving that credential 
contains one of the attributes {𝑒1, … , 𝑒𝑙} could be done by sending 
Commitment D to verifier using this protocol: 
 
𝑃𝐾{(𝜀, 𝑣′, 𝜇0, 𝜇1, 𝛼, 𝜌, 𝜌
′): 
𝑍 ≡ ±𝑅0
𝜇0𝑅1
𝜇1𝐴′𝜀𝑆𝑣
′
(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) ∧ 
𝐷 ≡ ±𝑔𝜇1ℎ𝜌𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 ∧ 𝑔∏ 𝑒𝑖
𝑙
𝑖 ≡ ±𝐷𝛼ℎ𝜌′𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 ∧ 
𝜇0,𝜇1𝜖 ± {0,1}
𝑙𝑚 ∧ 𝜀𝜖[2𝑙𝑒−1 + 1, 2𝑙𝑒 − 1]                            (4) 
 Credential contained an attribute e, so we get the value of a where 
𝑎𝑒 = ∏ 𝑒𝑖
𝑙
𝑖 . If e  is not in the list a  then e does not divide the product. 
 
The Proposed Secure E-Health System Design 
 In this section will be proposed a system that can improve the 
security of personal identity by using anonymous credential system.. This 
system allows the user to reveal and prove some of the attributes while 
others remain hidden, so the security of personal identity more awake. 
 
Privacy Requirements 
 The ability of the existing system in the hospital to maintain the 
privacy of personal identity of patients will increase the trust. Doctors only 
know partial information of the patient's personal identity.  
 
Security Requirements 
 There are two types of attributes, namely strong and weak attributes. 
Strong attributes are unique for each user such as address, and phone number 
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while weak attributes could be the same for each user such as name, and 
blood type. In this system, the strong attributes contain sensitive information 
that remained hidden when proving while weak attributes will be revealed. 
Disclosure of weak attributes must fulfill the security requirements where the 
user can select the attributes that will be revealed to prevent the disclosure of 
more information than required. 
 
Proof of Attributes Protocol 
user doctor E-health server
Consult a doctor 
Autentication using e-id
Verification of patient’s 
credential
Autentication using e-id
Verification of doctor’s 
credential
Access a patient’s health 
medical record
Provide a patient’s 
health medical record
Examine and 
diagnose patients
update patient’s health 
medical record
receive update patient’s 
health medical record
Prescribe and payment 
receipt
receive prescribe and 
payment receipt
 
Figure 1. Protocol of consult a doctor. 
 
 In this research, a credential from several attributes loaded into e-id, 
where e-id is obtained during the process of registration and used for the 
authentication process.  Fig. 1 shows the protocol when consulting a doctor. 
It can be seen that the doctor can see the patient's health medical record if the 
authentication success performed by doctors and patients. 
 
Prototype Implementation and proof of attributes testing 
 In this section will be explained the implementation of the prototype 
system, the results of testing proving algorithms and system performance. 
Specifications of Personal Computer can be seen in Table 1 and RFID reader 
and tag can be seen in Fig. 2. 
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Table 1. Specification of Personal Computer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. RFID reader and tag 
Attributes are information that used during the registration process, in 
which the attributes information consists of name, issuance modes 
(known, hidden) and type (int, String, enumeration). Figure 3 shows the 
registration form, in which the attributes that are used include name, 
address, phone number, identity card number, sex, birth date, blood type, 
civil status, and employment. Address, phone number, and identity card 
number are strong attributes and the others are weak attributes. the 
issuance mode of strong attributes are hidden and weak attributes are 
known, so the user that acts as prover knows all the attribute values but 
the verifier only knows weak attributes. 
 
Figure 3. Registration form. 
 
Specifications Remarks 
Operation System 
Microsoft Windows 7 
Professional 64-Bit (Build 7601) 
Processor 
Intel Core i5-2450M (2.50 GHz, 
3MB L3 Cache) (4 CPUs) 
Memory 8 GB RAM 
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Proof of Attributes Testing 
 In this section will be performed some testing which includes proof 
of CL signature, proof of AND, OR and NOT relations. 
 
Proof of CL Signature 
 In this experimental test, it will be proved that the value of 𝐴, 𝑒, 𝑣 are 
the signature of attributes. Fig. 3 show the example of signature from 9 
attributes. The value that will be obtained when authentication and 
verification process is the success are 𝑡 (proof process) and ?̂? (verify process) 
can be seen in Fig. 5. The test results showed that the proof is not rejected. 
 
 
Figure 4. Example of signature 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Proof and verify CL Signature 
 
Proof of AND Relation 
 In this experimental test, it will be proved that the patient will get 
medical check fee discount if the patient was a lecturer and not married. The 
value that will be obtained when authentication and verification process is 
the success are ?̃?, ?̃?0 (proof process) and ?̂?,  ?̂?0 (verify process) that can be 
seen in Fig. 6. The test results showed that the proof is not rejected and the 
patient can get medical check fee discount. 
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Figure 6. Proof and verify AND relation 
 
Proof of OR Relation 
 In this experimental test, it will be proved that the patient will get 
medical check fee discount if the patient was a lecturer or not married. The 
value that will be obtained when authentication and verification process 
success is ?̃?1, ?̃?2, ?̃?3, ?̃?4, ?̃?5, ?̃?6 (proof process) and ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3, ?̂?4, ?̂?5, ?̂?6 (verify 
process) that can be seen in Fig. 7. The test results showed that the proof is 
not rejected and the patient can get medical check fee discount. 
 
Figure 7. Proof and verify OR relation 
 
Proof of NOT Relation 
 In this experimental test, it will be proved that the patient will get 
medical check fee discount if the patient's civil status not married. The value 
that will be obtained when authentication and verification process is the 
success are ?̃?, ?̃?𝑐 (proof process) and ?̂?, ?̂?𝑐 (verify process) that can be seen 
in Fig. 8. The test results showed that the proof is not rejected and the patient 
can get medical check fee discount. 
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Figure 8.  Proof and verify NOT relation 
 
E-Health System Performance 
 In this section will be tested computational time for proving protocol. 
There are 3 kinds of schemes, namely testing for revealed, unrevealed and 
combination. For proving protocol with all attributes revealed, the attributes 
have issuance mode known, so when authentication process all of these 
attributes will be revealed to the verifier. Fig. 9 shows the computational 
time of proving protocol for 2 through 9 attributes. The test results show that 
the computational time from 2 through 9 attributes do not have a lot of time 
difference. The highest computational time is 0.8866 seconds occurs when 
the number of attributes 9. 
 For proving protocol with attributes unrevealed, the attributes have 
issuance mode hidden, so when authentication process all of these attributes 
will not be revealed to the verifier. Fig. 10 shows the computational time of 
proving protocol for 2 through 9 attributes. The test results show that the 
computational time from 2 through 9 attributes do not have a lot of time 
difference. The highest computational time is 0.91 seconds occurs when the 
number of attributes 7. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Proving protocol with all attributes revealed 
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Figure 10. Proving protocol with all attributes unrevealed 
 
 For proving protocol with a combination of both attribute, the 
attributes have issuance mode known and hidden, so when authentication 
process some of these attributes will be revealed to the verifier and the others 
remain hidden. Fig. 11 shows the computational time of proving protocol for 
2 through 9 attributes. The test results show that the computational time from 
2 through 9 attributes do not have a lot of time difference. The highest 
computational time is 0.8426 seconds occurs when the number of attributes 
3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Proving Protocol with mix attributes 
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Fig. 12 shows the comparison of computational time from 3 kinds of 
proving protocol, where the results showed that no significant difference in 
computational time for different number and types of attributes. The 
computational time of proving protocol is less than 1 second. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Comparison of 3 kinds of proving protocol. 
 
Conclusion 
 We proposed secure e-health system design that can be fulfilled the 
privacy and security requirements. The system allows the user to reveal and 
prove some of the attributes while others remain hidden, so the security of 
personal identity will be more secure. Proof attributes testing includes the 
selection of attributes disclosure, proof of CL signature, proof of AND, OR 
and NOT relations. The computational time for each proving protocol is less 
than 1 second. Overall it can be said that the system designed was able to 
increase the security of personal identity, thereby reducing the misuse of 
personal identity by unauthorized parties. 
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